Lesson Objective: Analyze qualities required for successful leadership and command in peacetime and combat operations including; conduct of international and civil-military relations; accountability for incidents occurring during command; leading joint and multinational forces; and the effects of combat (including associated political and public pressures) on the senior leader.

PJELAs: 1—National Security Strategy, 3—National Military Strategy and Organization, 4—Theater Strategy and Campaigning, 5—Systems Integration in 21st Century Battlespace

USAF Core Values: Integrity, Service before Self, Excellence in All We Do

USAF Core Competencies: Air and Space Superiority, Global Attack, Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support

1. Contrast the combat leadership requirements at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
2. Use the lessons of the Blackhawk shootdown and Khobar Towers incidents to predict the challenges of command particularly in combat situations.
3. Identify the key leadership characteristics required in the future organizational environment as influenced by demographics; social, economic, and technology changes; joint and coalition operations, and educational considerations.

1. Peace-to-War Transition Plan: CCs need to "think war" and not revert to irrelevant peacetime rules. Mission is top priority but also serves needs of subordinates, rescue wounded, get ammo to the front.
2. Make Decisions Fast: In peacetime, can weight different alternatives, coordinate with boss, peers, etc. Combat requires new approach. Be decisive. In peacetime avoid risk…but combat is high-risk environment that gets riskier if you are slow to make decisions.
3. Keep it Simple: Put your orders in language your weary troops can understand. This may mean translating HQ’s complicated plans into ‘easy-to-digest’ pieces.
4. Be Flexible: Be alert to opportunities. Eg. Do not rigidly follow doctrine if the enemy has figured out what you’re doing. Abandoning doctrine may be the right thing to do.
5. Expect Screw-ups: Don’t be a perfectionist…Weary troops can mess things up. Expect and plan for this.
6. Focus Attention on Next Few Days, not Next Few Minutes: Know the big picture…Act strategically…Your troops expect you to handle the "Big Picture" items. Don’t act like an LT or Capt…Be a COL or Gen.!!! Your job is to think long term!
7. Use Deception: "Always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never let up in pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic stricken, and can the be destroyed in detail.
8. Don’t Demand Exactness: Perfect is not always the best. Sometimes the exigencies of the situation require "good enough" to be the option we go with.
9. Manage both reserves and attrition: Don’t commit all your forces…Retain reserves to exploit an opportunity. Need enormous amount of self-discipline.
10. Get some rest: You’re no good if you’re tired out. Use your Deputy.
11. Get near the Action: Don’t spend too much time in the Command Post. Know what is going on in the field.
12. Have some Priorities and Follow them: Establish "mission type" orders so that all players know what the general game plan is. If com breaks down, they’ll at least have an idea of what to do next. Author uses US Grant as an example of this item.
13. Outsmart the Enemy: Combat is a test of wills and intellect. Rigidly following orders may not be the best policy. Operate within the "decision making cycle of the enemy" will get better results. Read lots of books on strategy. Author cites Patton and combat pilot John Boyd as examples.
14. Don’t Become Predictable: If enemy knows what you are going to do, that gives him an enormous advantage. But…don’t be so unpredictable that your own troops get confused.
15. Watch out for Emerging Combat Leaders: No matter what the rank, identify leaders and give them responsibility. Weed out those who are not making it. Do not let rigidity of peacetime rules on rank and date of rank restrict you.
16. Form an Opportunity Team: Pick two or three of your most innovative people and try to meet with them for a few minutes each day or two. Author cites Col Robin Olds in Vietnam…Olds tricked NVA pilots into thinking they were facing F-105s rather than the more deadly F-4s. The NVA planes that flew up to meet him, went down a lot faster than they came up. Olds got the idea by meeting with his pilots.
17. Keep on Training: If there is a quiet period, hone combat skills.
18. Help Your Boss be Better Commanders: Be brutally honest with the boss who makes a poor decision or fails to give you the authority you need to make decisions.
19. Stock CC post with a few books and Read them. Author cites 11 titles.
20. Hang on to Ethical Standards: Report system MUST be accurate. Give the boss BAD news as well as the GOOD news. Boss needs this in order to make informed decision. Do not exaggerate.

1. When, if at all, should leaders compromise their principles if it helps accomplish the mission?

No real answer to this in either of the first two articles which supposedly cover this DLO. Personal answer goes here.

2. To what degree does combat seem to turn a commander’s decisions into moral and ethical issues?

Combat usually involves much higher stakes (and risk) than non-combat, so decisions, which drive results, are more important. Also, there are sometimes that decisions must be made that will result in casualties. Decisions made in combat may have to be made quickly with incomplete information, yet may result in casualties. The importance of the decisions and the lack of an answer that is clearly right or wrong turns many situations into moral and ethical situations. The only ethical issue explicitly raised in the first two articles concerns telling the boss the truth (good or bad) and not exaggerating combat reports. In the Coffey Article about EAKER, Coffey relates some gruesome tales about combat in a B-17. There may be a "moral or ethical" issue in putting troops into harms way with less than perfect equipment and training.

3. How does the leadership environment change as an officer advances from squadron command to senior leadership positions?

In Coffey’s article, he points out that EAKER wanted to fly the Schwienfurt mission. That it would be easier for him to be in the cockpit rather than sitting helplessly at his desk awaiting reports from his bomber commander. EAKER was told that if he flew the Schweinfurt mission, his next flight would be to Washington. His role as a commander was to handle the ‘big picture’ issues like Gen Arnold and the British. Bottom line: As you go up in rank, you get less ‘hands-on’.

4. How does a senior combat commander measure victory? Bombs on target? Attrition rates? Maintaining public support? High unit morale?

1. What senior leadership and ethical issues are raised by the Blackhawks’ shootdown? How do we prevent a recurrence?

The main issue I see is that the senior leadership had concerns about the overall operation plan, yet didn’t take firm steps to correct this. The senior leadership let the units underneath them implement the plan as they saw fit without "big picture" oversight. The idea that people didn’t have to follow a plan if they considered it flawed is a major integrity issue. When some units operated within the plan but not others (no friendly aircraft within the no-fly-zone before completion of a fighter sweep) big picture conflicts will occur. Having your subordinate units operate under a plan you consider flawed is an ethical issue to me. The plan should have either been updated or replaced, something that was happening but never completed, even after several years of operation. Mistakes will be made, this is just part of being human. We can’t tolerate recklessness. Preventing any mistake is impossible, reducing the possibility of one occurring must be our main objective.

2. What USAF Core Values are relevant to the case cited above?

Integrity, Excellence in All We Do. The issues brought up in question #1 show the relevance to integrity. The fact that many of the officers were not as proficient as they should have been during the entire sequence of events goes against the Excellence value. We can’t have officers that are barely proficient in their jobs. Excellence is a standard well above proficient.

3. Were General Fogleman’s actions toward the Air Force officers involved in the Blackhawk shootdown appropriate? Why or why not?

I don’t think so. The personal supplemental evaluations were given as additional punishment. Evaluations are based on the person’s actions over the entire period, not just for a specific action. Lack of proficiency, a flawed operation plan and errors caused the accident not the officer’s recklessness or disregard for their mission. A "witch hunt" of this kind only serves to create a dangerous mindset. General Fogleman’s actions had no effect on correcting the problems. Just created a new one, the one mistake Air Force.

4. Is this a one mistake Air Force? Are there different standards for senior officers? If not, should it be?

Yes, historical examples have shown that in many instances, this is a one mistake Air Force, if the mistake involves catastrophic occurrence, such as loss of life or multi-billion dollar equipment, or violation of various ethical standards for officers (readings really only addressed loss of life):

(:Personal Accountability for Force Protection at Khobar Towers", Cohen, pp. 80, 81, 82, "The commander, who had been made aware of these vulnerabilities, failed to take actions within his authority to address them."

Regarding standards of accountability:

("Personal Accountability.., Cohen, p. 76: "A general officer must demonstrate judgment, awareness and resourecefullness well beyond that expected of more junior, less seasoned officers" In theory, therefore, the standard is higher for senior officers versus junior officers. In practice, senior officers have already attained a rank in which they can retire, even if reduced in grade (highly unlikely), whereas junior officers who make major mistakes frequently receive disciplinary action which brings their careers to a halt at a point where they will not be able to retire

In some cases, such as the Khobar Towers bombing for BG Schwalier. (It wasn’t clear that he made even ONE mistake!!) Sometimes there are different standards, and sometimes it is not clear what the standards are. An example is the several cases of romantic affairs that was in the news over the past couple years. If not, should there be? If there were strong leadership, from the Commander in Chief and on down, there would be clear standards that would apply in a much more consistent manner than there was during the Clinton administration (in my opinion).

5. Where is the traditional military service "belly button" for accountability? Is it possible—is it right—for no one to be held accountable for events like the Blackhawk shootdown?

Traditional "belly button" for accountability is the Commander. Usually at the base or Wing commander level, if there is a problem. If there is little that could have prevented the problem or to cover up a problem, a senior political "leader" will sometimes "accept all responsibility", but will usually not accept the consequences.

6. The Blackhawk shootdown and several other notable incidents prompted a renewed interest in core values and command responsibility, accountability and discipline. How would you summarize the essential lessons we should remember from that time?

Integrity and Excellence are the keys to maintaining our supremacy. If we know of a situation that is illegal or dangerous (flawed Oplan) we must take action to correct it. Not having the guts to rock the boat when it needs to be rocked can have grave consequences. The same with not maintaining complete proficiency. Officers at all levels are responsible for the lives and actions of their subordinates. With this responsibility comes accountability and discipline. ALL levels must be held accountable to the level of their responsibility.

7. Did we learn anything from Khobar Towers? Will this happen again? How do we prevent a recurrence?

1. What should be the standard by which we judge a commander’s performance when a disaster occurs?

It should depend entirely on the situation and the information available to the commander at that precise moment.

2. Was the investigation of Khobar Towers a search for accountability or culpability?

It started out as an investigation of the facts and a search for accountability, while it was under control of the military Air Force and Department of Defense. When it transitioned to the civilian / political arena, different standards were applied and it became a search for culpability. Under the Air force it was a fact-finding and accountability investigation. Under the political, civilian, and media spot light it was definitely a culpability issue. The media and political institutions wanted blood and I think Cohen gave them blood and I think it was a mistake.

3. How did actions taken following the bombing of the USS Cole contrast those of the Blackhawk and Khobar Towers incidents?

The USS Cole incident was investigated looking to how and what actions were taken based on the information available at that time. It focused on what SHOULD the commander have done with the available information not what COULD he have done. Based on this it found the commander did what he should have. He could have done other things that would have prevented the bombing but his decisions were correct and Monday morning quarterbacking was not the idea nor was it a "witch hunt". Admiral Vern Clark was very correct in his statements: "We must be taking a hard look at all we do and be ready, if we do not think we have been given the complete picture, to ask the hard questions to ensure the safety of our people." "Ours is a demanding profession. Sometimes it is a dangerous profession. Stay sharp. Be proud. Be safe. Be ready."

For DLO 3:

4. How will technological changes alter the relationships between commanders and those they lead, as well as between commanders and their peers, and commanders and their military and civilian leaders?

1. Virtual staff meetings from CC’s office. Staff attends meeting via palm pilot.
2. Organizational structure will be leaner. Advancements replace jobs.
3. Objective wing replaced by two-tiered structure: Support and Operations.

1. What new characteristics must a senior officer have to effectively lead future military forces?

Future commanders will have to be able to provide strategic leadership and deal with greater complexity. Situational awareness and an ability to manage media and politics will be important. It will be important for leaders to inspire others to follow as the military is downsized and commanders will have to rely more on civilians and contractors.

2. What are the leadership characteristics that help produce successful coalitions? What factors other than leadership are important in multinational operations?

I feel political savvy and the capability to get different people to compromise and achieve an agreement will increase in importance as more coalitions are used. The idea of a strict military commander "in charge" of a coalition force is becoming extinct. As we establish coalitions, we must take into account the needs and requirements of the other nations as well as ours in the military decisions. Without this type of leadership, the US will be forced to take on measures unilaterally.

3. What leadership traits have been effective in the past and will most likely remain effective in the future?

Morals and ethics (the wanting to do right), concern for subordinates, wisdom, effective decision making, communication skills, strategic leadership (clear vision and understanding of mission and effective implementation skills).

4. One of the basic tenets of O&P has been to preserve the military manning necessary to support deployed operations in a combat zone. Has this criterion been accomplished?

No, the readings had many examples of military functions that were replaced by contractors and civilians for several practical reasons.

5. Where are we likely to experience contractor personnel at risk while in direct support of combat operations?

In areas that start out as non-combat missions and escalate to a combat situation. But are they really non-combatants or combat support personnel without uniforms?

6. How can a commander exert influence over a contractor workforce?