Lesson Objective: Analyze the nature of strategic risks we face in the 21^st century battlespace, as planners incorporate the components o0f commercial or private air, space, and information superiority systems, with joint and multinational military forces.

Desired Learning Outcomes:

1. Explain the need for and obstacles to building a true aerospace force from both the USAF and joint service perspectives.
2. Appraise the merits and shortcomings of military strategy and doctrine regarding the US’s ability to exercise space control and force application in and from space.
3. Demonstrate use of symmetrical and asymmetrical strategies available to rogue state to thwart or defeat the US and its allies in a future major theater war (MTW) or small-scale contingency (SSC).

Space Force

• Focus responsibility for space activities currently distributed among many departments and agencies.
• A service Secretary responsible for space matters
• A single service with statutory responsibility to "organize, train and equip" for space operations.
• Develop a unified space doctrine and strategy
• Control, manage or eliminate military services’ specific space programs

Aerospace Integration

• Air and space are a seamless operational medium
• Potential migration of air power missions to space systems (Pg. 256)
• Extension of Air Force doctrine

1. Would force application from space render our expensive terrestrial, legacy systems, e.g. carrier battle groups, B-2s, obsolete? Is this true Revolution in Military Affairs that needs to come about?

Maj Rife’s reading cites an article published in the Naval Institutes journal Proceedings that if space-borne force application is fully realized that seaborne forces could become obsolete. Forces such as a carrier battle group could be threatened by low Earth orbit weapon systems. A similar conclusion can be reached for weapon platforms such as the B-2 bomber, which is a precision munitions delivery platform employing stealth technology to mitigate detection and risk. Space-borne weapons could deliver similar precision if their potential is fully realized by exploitation of its technological capabilities.

Rife expands his argument based on space-borne force application saying that, "Space power will be able to do virtually everything that airpower does today" and he adds with less risk. To the question whether force application from space resulting in the obsolescence of today’s terrestrial weapons systems, as a result of space system dominance, then yes, this is a Revolution in Military Affairs. This would be a rapid non-evolutionary change to the way the military does business today demanding change to doctrine. The resultant doctrinal change would result in strategy and force structure changes. As Rife discusses it would be a role reversal between space and terrestrial forces. Whereupon space systems today are used to support the terrestrial warfighting effort the terrestrial force would play a supporting role to the space system operator.

2. From a National Command Authority perspective, would you recommend supporting a CINC’s request to destroy, degrade, or disrupt another country’s space systems to support the CINC’s theater air campaign?

As the US is dependent on GPS for targeting and delivery of precision munitions, information satellites for C² and other space based reconnaissance to conduct theater air campaign, so eventually will its adversaries. Yes, the disruption, degradation or destruction of adversaries space systems should be an objective of a CINC.

Yes, is the direct military answer but the political implications may lead to another decision. It should be considered whether the adversary has space based systems of his own that provide his military capabilities or is he buying these capabilities from a "neutral" third party nation or commercial non-state organization. The complications of decisions to impair commercial systems and interfere with the trade of a non-belligerent or to imply or accuse or threaten to impair a "neutral" nation’s space system need to be considered in terms of cost benefit to US interest and efforts (see Pg. 252 & 277-280).

3. Pearl Harbor was seminal event that changed the US Navy from a "battleship Navy" to a Navy where the aircraft carrier was the centerpiece of its capability to project and apply force. What might a "space Pearl Harbor" look like? What would be the outcome of this type of event?

A "Space Pearl Harbor" could be the denial, disruption or destruction of US space systems. This could take the form of attacking satellites in space, communications links to and from the ground or ground stations that command the satellites and process their data. The Commission’s report cites three examples of events that may be used as warnings of US vulnerabilities:

• 1998 failure of Galaxy IV satellite effecting massive US pagers and video feeds to the cable broadcast industry.
• Year 2000 three hour lost of information because of failure of ground station computers.
• Year 2000 report of China’s military developing methods and strategies to defeat US space systems in a future war.

During a time of crisis vulnerabilities to space systems could:

• Hamper efforts to identify and strike terrorist in retaliation from attack upon US forces, citizens abroad or in the homeland.
• Deconflicting a crisis in the Taiwan Straits through military coercion and diplomatic measures
• Missile launch capabilities

DLO 3:

1. What is the status of the US information warfare strategy?

In the Stein reading and at the time this article was written he claims that, "there is neither formal military doctrine nor official definitions of information warfare. In the absence of doctrine he goes on to say that, "they [US armed forces] are developing, quite appropriately, the tools and techniques to execute the national military strategy for operational-level cyberwar. They are simultaneously, albeit unintentionally, developing the tools and capabilities to execute a national strategic information war strategy."

2. What are the obstacles to information dominance?

In the Stein article he writes that Infospere dominance may be as complex and elusive as "escalation dominance" appeared to be in nuclear strategy". He claims that dominance will be expensive both to the US business community and to the US armed forces as they are required to devote more and more resources to the effort. Secondly, Stein reasons that the US lacks the ability to prosecute an information war because the political and legal issues are unclear. He cites as examples; when would a nation "declare" an information war? What is the operations plan? In Congress, who has policy oversight for information warfare? A third reason as a proposed obstacle Stein attributes to the lack of competence on the part of the executive agencies to determine the "substantive" content to be communicated. Or, in other words justification for the moral message to be imparted that would be in keeping with public consensus.

3. How might future adversaries use space and information operations to level the playing field in MTW or SSC projected two years from now?

Use of asymmetrical attacks on US vulnerabilities such as the "information highway". Broadcast of "fictive" claims by adversaries with access to satellite down links leading us to believe false claims or manipulated reality. The domestic computer, communications and information networks essential for the daily functioning of American society are very vulnerable to penetration and manipulation by determined hackers.

4. What strategy would you adopt to deter or thwart the United States and its regional allies in a future MTW or SSC attack and defense?

As stated in the Stein paper nations such as China, Iran or Saudi Arabia has made efforts to insulate their nations from the effects of global communications networks. This type of strategy would minimize the effects of "fictive" information attacks and provides a measure of command and control do to the avoided disruption and chaos that may result from this form of attack.